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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN WORKING MEMORY AFFECT SITUATION 
AWARENESS 
 
Situation awareness (SA) is a construct that brings together theories of attention, 
memory, and expertise in an empirical effort to showcase what awareness is and how it is 
acquired by operators.  Endsley (1995a) defined SA in a way that includes many 
theoretical associations between awareness and specific memory and attention 
mechanisms.  Work characterizing these relationships has been sparse, however, 
particularly with regard to the influence of working memory (WM) on SA in novices.  An 
experiment was devised which principally investigated novice SA as a theorized function 
of WM across two distinct tasks; one in which operator attention and perception (Level 1 
SA) was assessed, and one in which an operator’s ability to respond to events in the 
future (Level 3 SA) was implicitly assessed.  Factors analysis was used and resulting 
outcomes from three WM tasks loaded well onto one overall WM factor.  Findings from 
99 participants indicate that WM does have a correlative and predictive relationship with 
Level 3, but not Level 1 SA.  Results reported here contribute to ongoing theory and 




showing WM influences awareness in novice performance even in the case where SA 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
What is Situation Awareness? 
Situation awareness (SA) is an empirical description of human operator 
awareness for the performance of complex dynamic tasks.  A few key publications in this 
domain have developed a widely accepted conceptualization of awareness (e.g., Endsley 
1995a; 1995b), with Endsley (1995a) in particular setting forth a clear definition as “the 
perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” 
(36).  Each of these main ideas is described as a “Level” of situation awareness, thus 
Level 1 SA is the perception of critical elements of information in the environment, Level 
2 represents the comprehension and integration of the information elements, and Level 
3 SA represents the mental prediction of the environment or system state into the 
future.  The accuracy of operator awareness, then, can be broken down into these same 
tractable portions for further understanding.   
While there have been arguments about the viability of situation awareness by a 
small number of researchers (see Dekker & Hollnagel, 2004), many others have made it 
clear that SA assessment is not simply a buzzword, but is a useful evaluative measure for 
analyzing the behavior of humans operating in complex systems (Durso & 
Sethumadhavan, 2008; Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2008; Wickens, 2008).  The 
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trend in the field has been to examine the SA-specific requirements for certain tasks 
(Durso & Sethumadhavan, 2008) while remaining theoretical at times with regard to the 
contributions of underlying cognitive processes which contribute to SA.   
Though SA has been shown to reflect more than the individual summation of 
processes (in other words there is a gestalt benefit of SA above any singular 
contributions of attention, memory, or any other individual process; Durso, Bleckley, & 
Dattel, 2006), this  finding does not rule out the importance of individual differences.  
Individual differences in attention and memory have been shown to exhibit important 
and empirical relationships to awareness (Endsley & Bolstad, 1994; Gonzalez & 
Wimisberg, 2007; Gugerty & Tirre, 2000; O’brien & O’hare, 2007; Sohn & Doane, 2004) 
and SA has also been shown to differ between operators as a function of task expertise 
(Sohn & Doane, 2004) which suggests a strong memory component.  It is not well known 
how these relationships contribute to awareness specifically within the context of the 
SA model posited by Endsley (1995a).  Endsley (1995a)’s three level model has been 
applied effectively to many settings though, and is applicable for dissociating the 
contribution of cognitive processes, as influence can be summed at each Level, allowing 
for more sensitivity (Endsley & Bolstad, 1994).  The remaining section will highlight the 
empirical work and theory surrounding each Level in Endsley’s model. 
Levels of awareness and associated empirically supported theory. 
Endsley’s model contains three levels of SA corresponding to perception, 
integration and comprehension, and finally prediction.   
Level 1 situation awareness. 
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Level 1 SA embodies the concept of critical information noticing.  Level 1 SA is 
considered perception-based awareness, and the allocating or directing of attention is 
the main influencer of whether information is perceived by an operator (Endsley, 
1995a).  These attention mechanisms influence where, when, and how well the 
operator can generally gather information (Endsley, 1995a).  Past work, however, has 
shown only a small relationship between SA and attention and this effect appears to be 
modulated by the degree of difficulty of any attention task, with more difficult tasks 
showing a slightly more significant relationship (Endlsey & Bolstad, 1994). 
Level 1 SA is also considered the building block of further SA understanding.  By 
gathering the critical information in the environment together, an operator fosters 
understanding of elemental relationships and then interprets the information.  Thus, 
Level 1 SA builds to allow Level 2 SA to form. 
Level 2 situation awareness. 
Level 2 SA is considered by Endsley (1995a) to be reliant on memory, though 
attention is certainly involved.  It represents the integration and the interpretation of 
critical elements (information), which relies on both long term memory and working 
memory (Endsley, 1995a).  Long term memory helps operators classify and understand 
information in the environment via schemas, while working memory is primarily used 
for manipulating, combining, or keeping information available to the operator.  Recent 
conceptualizations of working memory (WM) consider it to be a limited capacity storage 
system used to keep currently focused information available over short term periods of 
time, and to allow for the immediate manipulation of that information in the mind of 
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the operator (Baddeley, 1986).  Thus SA theory has been developed to incorporate this 
understanding of cognitive ability, but also its limitation; in other words, at a certain 
level, awareness might be constrained by an operator’s limited WM capacity. 
Integrating knowledge relies on WM involvement – however in experts and 
highly experienced operators, this may be represented by a special subset, called long-
term working memory (LT-WM) as proposed by Ericsson and Kintsch (1995).  The theory 
proposes that an operator acquires extensive representations of task information in 
long term memory with large amounts of practice, which increases the functional 
capacity of WM via templates.  This gives expert operators an easily accessed context in 
which to place information for storage and retrieval (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995), and this 
ability has been shown to contribute significantly to awareness in experts distinct from 
other measures of WM (Sohn & Doane, 2004). 
WM and the interactions with long term memory are important for integrating, 
interpreting, and storing information.  Endsley (1995a) postulated that these cognitive 
processes are also taxed heavily during the final level of awareness, Level 3. 
Level 3 situation awareness. 
Level 3 SA represents the prediction component of awareness.  Here, a 
conceptualization of how an operator engages in attempts to predict events in the 
environment is presented by Endsley.  An accurate prediction of an event is only 
achievable in most cases by possessing a mastery of the complexities of the system 
being evaluated.  Operators who are able to predict changes well anticipate future 
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events and appreciate any upcoming changes in the system, increasing their awareness 
of the near-future (Endsley, 1995a) and their ability to take appropriate actions.   
The ability to conduct effective perception of the elements of information (Level 
1 SA accuracy) continues to play a role at this later Level as well.  For example Bellenkes, 
Wickens, and Kramer (1997) showed novice pilots tend to be less proficient in 
anticipating future aircraft states, in part because of their visual scan patterns, which are 
characteristically inflexible.  Expert pilots exhibited more anticipatory behavior, 
primarily as a function of their flexible visual scanning to more predictive elements in 
the cockpit.  Thus their control over perception of information (Level 1) and their 
interpretation of that information (Level 2) aid them in prediction (Level 3) above 
novices who are limited in initial information acquisition. 
Expertise also influences the impact that WM may exert at these levels, with 
experts relying more on LT-WM than novices (Sohn & Doane, 2004).  Only a handful of 
studies have looked at the contributing cognitive factors specifically at the third Level of 
SA (Gonzalez & Wimisberg, 2007; O’brien & O’hare, 2007; Sohn & Doane, 2004) and 
past research makes the case that novice participants may differ significantly in the 
contributing constructs driving their awareness.  
The following section covers major ways that SA has been assessed, potential 
pitfalls in different techniques, and the methods used in a later experiment. 
Situation awareness measurement techniques 
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Techniques determine our ability to accurately measure awareness and 
discriminate among the Levels.  There are two overarching types of SA measurement; 
subjective and objective. 
Subjective SA Measures 
A number of subjective rating techniques, including SART (Situation Awareness 
Rating Technique) and SA-SWORD (Situation Awareness-Subjective Workload 
Dominance) exist to measure what an operator believes about their own SA (see Jones, 
2000 for an extensive review). 
Subjective SA assessments possess several shortcomings; in particular, an 
operator’s knowledge about what should be perceived or noticed may be inadequate 
due to inexperience (Jones, 2000) and any self-reports may be poorly diagnostic of 
awareness since the operator may feel that they are aware despite being unaware of 
critical information.  Additional evidence (Venturino, Hamilton, & Dvorchak, 1989 as 
cited in Jones, 2000) also suggests that subjective SA ratings are highly influenced by the 
quality of performance.  If performance during a test session is perceived as good, 
operators typically rate their awareness as “high”, and if performance is poor they rate 
SA as “low” – in other words, subjective ratings can anchor on task performance instead 
of personal levels of awareness (Venturino et al., 1989).   
Objective SA Measures 
Two widely used objective measures of awareness are the Situation Awareness 
Global Assessment Technique, or SAGAT (Endsley, 1988; 1995a) and the Situation 
Present Assessment Method, or SPAM (Durso et al, 1998). 
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SAGAT is an interruption-based technique where operators are asked questions 
about critical components along all three Levels of SA mid-task, or in some cases can be 
administered immediately post-task.  Each question is typically developed via a cognitive 
task analysis of the system, which identifies all of the critical task information needed 
for both performance and awareness.  The accuracy of responses to these questions 
determines how aware the operator is, and responses can be categorized by each 
distinct Level of SA (1, 2, or 3).   
One key aspect of SAGAT is that it requires a temporary pause to probe 
performance in order to answer administered questions.  While some researchers 
object to the interruption of the task, research has validated the use of the technique by 
showing that interruptions from questioning do not interfere with SA or performance 
(Endsley, 2000); however it does represent a deviation from the conditions of real-world 
task performance. 
Other methods exist for objective SA assessment including SPAM.  This method 
queries operators during ongoing task performance without any pausing of the activity.  
Instead of relying solely on answer accuracy, reaction times to queries are used to 
determine awareness.  Shorter reaction times therefore indicate the information is 
currently in the operator’s awareness (Durso et al., 1998).  The SPAM measure, 
however, can be negatively influenced by operator mental workload which slows 
question answering even when the answer may be known at the time.  The technique 
also makes answering questions about spatial relationships and location difficult to 
assess due to the verbal nature of the inquiry; in other words, operators can not 
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indicate verbally where some object or information is located with sensitivity compared 
to metrics where the indication can be made using actual spatial representations and 
operator responses, such as a map where an operator can physically indicate where an 
object is.   
Another measure of SA uses indirect task performance to specifically assess 
awareness (Brickman et al., 1999; Pritchett & Hansman, 1997; Yanco & Drury, 2004).  An 
important distinction of this method from SAGAT and SPAM is that it is unobtrusive.  
This method has been used to infer operator awareness by monitoring behavior in 
response to a potential hazard which required action from the operator – in this case, a 
runway incursion (Pritchett & Hansman, 1997).  The delay between onset of the hazard 
and appropriate behavioral action is a measure of awareness, which differs from 
performance because even if the hazard is avoided (successful performance) the relative 
delay in action may be characteristic of lower overall awareness to the hazard. 
An important advantage of this indirect task methodology stems from the ease 
of implementation by avoiding other confounds as mentioned for SAGAT and SPAM - 
there is no task interruption, which while having been shown to be innocuous may still 
interrupt operator cognition, and questions are not administered verbally or mid-task 
which leaves the operator free to allocate full mental resources to the task at hand 
which is contextually consistent with real-world performance. 
One goal of the current study is to conduct assessment of specific cognitive 
mechanisms’ contributions which are theorized to be underlying awareness.  The 
avoidance of subjective measures (and thus potentially low construct validity) is 
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paramount.  An indirect SA measurement technique represents a particularly nice case 
for evaluating individual differences impacting SA, since these effects may be small and 
disrupted by injecting an increased load or interruptions via other assessment 
techniques, particularly in novices who are already dealing with unfamiliar situations 
and tasks.  The following section highlights the empirically supported individual 
differences that contribute to general awareness ability. 
Individual differences and the influence on situation awareness 
Endsley (1995a; 1995b) theorized that many cognitive processes, including 
memory and attention, were implicated in the ability to form SA and maintain 
awareness in complex tasks.  In the previous year, a seminal paper by Endsley and 
Bolstad (1994) examined a variety of these influences by measuring the spatial ability, 
attention, perception, memory, and analytical skills of their participants.  After 
completing tests, expert pilots were asked to engage in several simulated air-to-air 
combat scenarios.  SAGAT was administered at different points during the simulation, or 
not at all, and participant answers were compared to recordings from the simulation 
and scored on the accuracy of their responses.  Several spatial measures correlated well 
with SA accuracy; however attention and perception measures correlated with SA 
accuracy only when the tasks were at their highest difficulty, suggesting that in order to 
attribute these constructs to general SA ability in experts, it is necessary to tax the 
participants heavily.  Because there was no condition in which novice pilots were 
similarly tested, however, the characterization of novice awareness was not explored 
10 
 
and therefore represents a case in which processes contributing to awareness may be 
differing in their contribution.   
It is therefore conceivable that awareness in experts may be differentially 
influenced by perceptual processes and WM.  In addition, it has been shown that during 
dynamic task performance the ability of the operator to focus attention improves 
information perception.  WM contributes to performance on Level 1 style tasks 
(Bleckley, Durso, Crutchfield, Engle, & Khanna, 2003).  High WM capacity participants in 
the study showed characteristics of flexible allocation of attention in a location 
identification task.  This flexibility aided performance, while those participants with low 
working memory capacity remained fixed in their attention allocation and performed 
worse than high capacity participants (Bleckley et al., 2003).  Other research suggests 
attention is controlled through WM.  Lavie and De Fockart (1995) notably showed that 
by increasing WM load, the attention capture rate from a non-target stimulus also 
increased.  Thus, the ability of an operator to attend selectively to information in an 
environment while ignoring competing information depends on WM and this may show 
up in WM-SA relationships as well. 
Timing involved in the direction of attention has been tagged as potentially 
driving individual differences in SA (Endsley, 1995a) and interestingly has also been 
related to WM (Baddeley, Chincotta, & Adlam, 2001).  Baddeley et al. (2001) found that 
the completion time of a list of simple math problems that required task switching was 
significantly increased when participants were concurrently engaged in a verbal trail 
task (theorized to tax executive processes involved in attention allocation and the 
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control of WM).  And in a more SA-relevant example, Boldstad, Endsley, Howell, and 
Costello (2003) showed that training on a task switching task does not improve real-
world task switching performance in pilots, suggesting this is a stable ability (much as 
WM is considered to be stable within participants). 
The ability to task switch seems to rely significantly on attentional control, which 
clearly implicates WM.  Therefore, although attention is involved in awareness at a basic 
level (attending to information in the environment), attention may be directed by WM 
(choosing where to attend, and when) (Bleckley et al., 2003; Bolstad et al., 2003; Lavie & 
De Fockart, 1995).  Examining the relationship between WM and SA more fully should 
help answer the question of exactly how WM may impact distinct Levels of awareness, 
and where the theory needs to be updated or revised 
Working Memory 
It seems clear that WM plays a role in awareness in dynamic tasks.  The driver of 
a vehicle must maintain a myriad of critical information including knowledge of travel 
directions, traffic conditions, awareness of the location of the vehicle in space, and 
knowledge about the state of the vehicle itself, all of which is held within memory 
(Gugerty & Tirre, 2000).  Individual variance in WM translates to individual differences in 
the amount of critical information and number of relationships between elements an 
operator is capable of maintaining at any given time – not to mention their ability to 
anticipate collisions (aiding avoidance).  WM is theoretically important for accurate 
formation of Level 2 SA and Level 3 SA (Endsley, 1995a) and research supports this 
(Gugerty & Tirre, 2000; O’brien & O’hare, 2007; Sohn & Doane, 2004).  However, others 
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have shown WM to be related to principles of Level 1 SA formation as well (Bleckley et 
al., 2003; Bolstad et al., 2003; Lavie & De Fockart, 1995).  The following sections 
highlight research which considers individual differences in WM and their impact on SA. 
Research highlighting the relationship between WM and SA. 
Various measures of WM have been used to examine the influence WM may 
have on performance and SA (Carretta, Perry, & Ree, 1996; Gonzalez & Wimisberg, 
2007; Gugerty & Tirre, 2000; O’brien & O’hare, 2007; Sohn & Doane, 2004); however 
these measures differ significantly from each other in many ways.  While some 
researchers (Gonzalez & Wimisberg, 2007; Sohn & Doane, 2004) choose to use 
traditional measures of WM from previous studies such as the letter rotation task from 
Shah and Miyake (1996), others have used complex batteries of tests that include 
measures of WM (usually span-based tasks) mixed with other metrics and use a 
combined score for participants.  For example, Gugerty and Tirre (2000) used the CAM 
battery (Cognitive Abilities Measurement), ASVAB (Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery), and the AFOQT (Air Force Officer Qualifying Test) to assess participants and 
compiled a WM measure; and O’brien and O’hare (2007) used a battery test called 
WOMBAT which also contains a WM measure.  These batteries of tests make results 
harder to interpret for pure WM influence due to potential interference from other 
tasks that are included in the test. 
Engle and colleagues (Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway (1999), Kane et al., 
2004; Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004) have supported the idea that WM is one single 
construct.  Other recent work has shown span-based WM tasks (specifically reading 
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span, operation span, and counting span) load well onto a single construct of WM, 
separate from other tasks that load more appropriately onto a short term memory 
construct (Engle et al., 1999).  Additional work has also suggested factor analytical 
methodologies are generally successful in showing relationships between WM and SA 
(Gugerty & Tirre, 2000).  Therefore including one single test of WM, such as reading 
span, is less than ideal, given that it alone will not represent the construct of WM as well 
as a factor analytical model with additional task loadings.  The most ideal approximation 
of WM could therefore be gained by eliciting several WM measures from participants 
and loading them onto a WM factor which is then used for later statistical analyses. 
The hypothesized relationship between WM and SA has been previously 
assessed in various ways, from correlational analyses (Gonzalez & Wimisberg, 2007) to 
predictions of awareness or performance gained by examining measures of WM across 
various tasks and environments (Carretta et al., 1996; Gugerty & Tirre, 2000; O’brien & 
O’hare, 2007; Sohn & Doane, 2004).  Carretta et al. (1996) examined military fighter 
pilots using a subjective awareness rating survey.  Pilots were evaluated by peers and 
superiors on 31 behavioral survey items representative of individual traits and job-
related tasks (such as tactics and communication).  After controlling for flight 
experience, six different significant predictors of subjective SA emerged which included 
a measure of verbal WM, a measure of spatial WM, and a measure of spatial reasoning.  
Although WM was a significant predictor, the subjective rating of SA may be reflective of 
the quality of information integration or prediction that the operators are perceived to 
be capable of doing.  It is unclear how accurate the subjective judgments were and if 
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they fall victim to the pitfalls of subjective SA measures.  More objective work is needed 
to decipher how individual differences in WM contribute to awareness. 
A step in this direction was taken by O’brien and O’hare (2007) who looked at 
how individual differences affect SA accuracy when performing an air traffic control 
task.  Participants were measured using the WOMBAT battery, a domain independent 
measure of an operator’s ability to handle various demands of complex task 
performance under changing priorities (O’brien & O’hare, 2007).  WOMBAT consists of 
four subcomponents which include a WM task and several tracking and spatial 
processing tasks.  Using the resulting scores from WOMBAT, participants were 
categorized into low and high SA ability groups, and high SA ability participants were 
shown to perform better than low SA ability participants (correctly planning more flight 
patterns).  In a second experiment, SAGAT technique queries were administered during 
pauses of the ATC simulation.  The accuracy of answers to Level 2 SA and Level 3 SA 
queries were also found to be significantly positively correlated with scores on the 
WOMBAT battery.  Thus over two experiments O’brien and O’hare (2007) showed that 
differences in WM-related measures were able to explain differences in operator 
awareness at later Levels (2 and 3).  One issue with using O’brien and O’hare’s (2007) 
results to support the WM-SA relationship is their use of the WOMBAT measure since it 
is potentially confounding spatial processing and tracking with more standard measures 
of WM.   
To truly examine WM’s pure contribution to SA, one might parse SA into levels 
that are influenced by separate processes, and assess the relationship at each level thus 
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lending discriminate validity to the examination.  Gugerty and Tirre (2000) used a similar 
methodology to show individual differences in WM are predictive of separate 
awareness levels within a driving task.  In their study, participants completed multiple 
ability assessment batteries (CAM and ASVAB) and two driving trials in a simulator.  
During the driving simulation, participants responded to hazards (such as a merging 
vehicle that would result in a collision if no action was taken to avoid it) and were 
assessed on their ability to remember the locations of cars which occupied their blind 
spots.  The potential Level of awareness being measured can be inferred, such that 
hazard detection reflects a Level 1 or Level 2 SA process because it is reliant on 
perception, and also on integrating (because identifying a hazard requires merging 
information together, not simply the perception of the vehicle).  Blind spot car detection 
would instead be reliant on the prediction of the location of the car, which represents a 
dynamic process that takes place as a part of Level 3 SA. 
A factor analysis resulted in a measure from each ability assessment which 
represented a combined WM and fluid g score.  Each metric was shown to correlate 
significantly with performance on the hazard detection task (more WM/g ability related 
to greater hazard detection), and the blind spot memory task (more WM/g related to 
less error).  Perhaps the correlation between the WM/g factor and blind spot accuracy is 
not surprising, given the role WM likely plays in any memory-based task.  What is new 
here is the association between WM/g and the implicit measure of Level 1/2 SA 
measured by the hazard detection task. 
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During a second experiment, participants completed different cognitive ability 
measures (the AFOQT and a subset of CAM 4.1) which combined three measures of 
WM, including a complex spatial task, a number reasoning task, and a complex verbal 
task.  These measures of WM were also found to be significant predictors of hazard 
detection responses, and explained 11% of the variance in detection of a vehicle in the 
driver’s blind spot.  These results are much easier to interpret because the WM 
measures used are not inclusive of additional task performance such as that used by 
WOMBAT, though they are tied with fluid g.  This suggests that some relationship 
between WM and Level 1 SA is present, but could be tied to memory-requiring 
questions. 
Gonzalez and Wimisberg (2007) similarly assessed the relationship of a pure WM 
measure and SA; operators in their experiment controlled a water purification plant 
simulation and SA was assessed using the SAGAT technique under two different 
conditions.  In the first condition, the simulation display was covered during queries and 
in the second, the simulation display was left uncovered.  The letter rotation task from 
Shah and Miyake (1996) was used as a measure of operator WM, which was shown to 
be a significant predictor of SA accuracy in the covered condition but not in the 
uncovered condition, suggesting a reliance on WM when the display was covered during 
questioning.   
As in Gugerty and Tirre (2000) it should not be surprising that a WM measure is 
related to performance on essentially a memory test, and the differential strength of 
the relationship between WM and SA during the covered and uncovered conditions 
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alludes to this.  However, Gonzalez and Wimisberg (2007) showed the methodological 
efficacy of keeping WM measures separate from extraneous tasks, as only the WM task 
assessed is involved in the relationship although only one span task was used.  As 
discussed previously, other WM measures should be included in a factor analytical 
method, and this may come to be important in assessing and determining the most 
influential approximation of WM and how the WM construct is tapped in dynamic 
environments. 
In general, WM has been shown to be predictive of awareness in some way at 
every Level; however these relationships are dependent on whether the awareness 
metric is memory invoking, and may change over the time spent performing a task.  The 
following section covers this possibility from the perspective of skill learning and finds 
limited evidence that relationships between WM and SA behave in a similar way. 
Theory on the Time Course of the Ability, WM, and SA Relationship   
Research into the contribution of WM and cognitive ability as related to task 
performance and skill acquisition suggests it is important to consider the time course of 
any effects observed between WM and SA.  For instance, training on a task has been 
shown to influence the correlation or contribution of WM to performance in several 
studies (Ackerman, 1988; 1989; Rabbitt, Banerji, & Szymanski, 1989).  Two studies by 
Ackerman (1988; 1989) suggest individual ability has the largest correlation to task 
performance early on in training, but that this relationship decays over time spent on 
the task.   
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In contrast, results from a study by Rabbitt, Banerji and Szymanski (1989) 
suggest that correlation between task performance and cognitive ability actually 
increases with practice.  Participants in their study played a dynamic game, Space 
Fortress, and the correlation between a general intelligence metric (using two 
intelligence tests, the AH-4 and AH-5) and performance within the game was measured.  
The correlation was initially low after the first hour of game play, but significantly 
increased by the fifth hour.  Rabbitt et al. explained these results by suggesting 
increased intelligence allows participants to both attend more to the important 
elements of the task (echoing a similar argument for the contribution of WM to 
effective attention allocation and accurate Level 1 SA) and to learn rules for the game 
more quickly, leading to greater performance (Rabbitt et al., 1989). 
While the ability-performance relationship has been examined extensively and 
characterized over time, the ability-SA relationship is largely unknown.  Gonzalez and 
Wimisberg (2007) examined this relationship between WM and SA accuracy and found 
that the correlation between WM and SA decreased with practice on their task.  These 
results are in support of some of Ackerman’s learning theories which predict that 
contribution of ability to performance should decrease over time (Ackerman, 1989).   
The decay of the WM-SA relationship has been investigated indirectly as well by 
using samples of experts who have spent considerable time in performance of the task 
(Sohn & Doane, 2004) and comparing expert awareness to novice awareness.  
Theoretically, if the relationship between WM and SA decays over the time spent on the 
task, there should be no predictability of expert awareness through WM, while novice 
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awareness should be predicted well by WM.  Participants in Sohn and Doane (2004) saw 
two consecutive screens depicting changes in aircraft instrument states, in conjunction 
with a goal for the future state of the aircraft, and were asked if the goal state would be 
reached within a certain time period.  Accuracy in awareness was measured as the 
correct identification of the goal state as being either reachable or unreachable.  
Significant positive correlations were found between WM spatial span and accuracy in 
the SA task, but importantly this varied by expertise; novice SA relied on WM, but expert 
SA was best predicted by a measure of LT-WM which took previous underlying 
knowledge of aircraft and instrumentation experience into account (Sohn & Doane, 
2004). 
These data show a clear differentiation between novices and experts in the 
influence of WM regarding an accurate SA prediction, and suggest that WM plays a large 
role in novice awareness with this role falling away at the expert level (Sohn & Doane, 
2004).  These results also confirm that utilizing novices instead of experts may yield 
different levels of WM influence, and that relatively memory-unrelated SA assessments 
(such as these prediction tasks) are still able to be significantly related to traditional WM 
measures. 
Intermixed in task performance (shown to be related to individual differences), is 
the relationship between performance and SA.  Endsley (1993) characterized good SA as 
related but not determinant of good performance and vice versa; in other words, an 
operator can be aware of all critical information but apply the wrong concept to the 
data, or be completely unaware but “luck” into the right decisions and perform well.  
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Because both WM and SA are tied to performance it will be critical to show that both 
are contributing in unique ways. 
Scaled Worlds and Awareness 
To assess SA in any task is challenging, and to have sensitive experimental 
control within the task is perhaps even more so.  Researchers have used simulations or 
in some cases programmable microcosms of real-world tasks such as driving and flight 
simulations, air traffic control tasks, and firefighting tasks to investigate the ability to be 
aware in our environment and chart human decision making performance.  Past work 
shows these are in general fruitful experimental means that allow a great deal of 
manipulation while staying in close approximation of real world activities and conditions 
which provides needed ecological validity.  One task which has been shown useful is 
Networked Fire Chief (NFC; Omodei & Wearing, 1998), a firefighting simulation.  In a 
seminal paper, Omodei and Wearing (1995) showed that NFC can be used for assessing 
a wide variety of questions, many about decision making.   
The task in NFC is complex and in many ways speaks not only to decision making, 
but also to prototypical elements of SA; operators are given control of multiple fire 
engines to put out fires that appear on a grid-based area of land by moving a fire engine 
to the location of the fire and then activating the engine to spray water.  Operators also 
monitor the amount of water left in the fire engine, and move engines to lake areas on 
the map whenever they are in need of a refill.  Wind is a factor within the simulation 
and determines the direction a fire spreads, indicated by a compass direction visible at 
all times on the sidebar of the simulation.  The wind element makes the firefighting task 
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additionally dynamic – for instance, if the wind blows from the south the fire will spread 
to the north, but the wind may also shift causing the fire’s progressing direction to 
change.   
At any given point during the active simulation, the operator can only see a 
portion of the overall land area that exists.  It is only possible to view the other areas by 
moving a viewing box, located on the sidebar of the simulation to view the other areas.  
This can be accomplished when the operator chooses to do so, at the assumed cost of 
losing view of the other areas of the map. 
NFC scores participants (performance) on the area of the map that is burned out 
of a possible perfect score of 100 (no land burned), all the way down to 0 (all land 
burned) and different land types, such as houses or forest areas, can be weighted as 
more or less important to protect from fire.  In addition to this overall performance 
measure, the amount of water used during trials can also be tracked as a more process-
based measure of performance. 
Overall the NFC simulation is an opportune task for assessing awareness due to 
the constant need to track and refresh knowledge of the location of fire engines, and 
fires; the necessity of taking the prevailing wind direction, a fire engine’s water amount, 
and the locations of water refill areas into account, keeping the overall goal of limiting 
fire spread in mind, and executing all tasks in a timely and as efficiently a manner as 
possible. 
Summary and methods 
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WM has been shown to exhibit strong relationships to awareness, and has also 
accounted in some ways for other individual differences clearly related to SA such as 
timing and attention allocation.   
Evidence suggests individual differences in WM may impact all Levels of SA 
(Gugerty & Tirre, 2000) and WM may represent a general underlying process.  This 
process may contribute more to novice awareness than to expert SA (Sohn & Doane, 
2004) and depend differentially on time spent performing the task (Gonzalez & 
Wimisberg, 2007) and the nature of the WM tasks used for predicting and correlating 
the relationship.  The potential impact of operator WM ability on SA in general has only 
been investigated in part (Durso, Bleckley, & Dattel, 2006; Gonzalez & Wimisberg, 2007; 
Gugerty & Tirre, 2000; O’brien & O’hare, 2007; Sohn & Doane 2004).  What has not 
been adequately addressed is the explicit contribution of WM to novice SA across 
Levels.  Instead, these ideas have been spread out over several different studies, or 
examined exclusively in experts. Additionally, the relationship between WM and SA has 
relied primarily on investigations that involved clear memory-based tasks, rather than 
more implicit SA measures, and the effects may differentiate between these two 
metrics. 
The relatively unconfirmed nature of WM contributions to awareness accuracy 
at each of the Levels of SA conceptualized by Endsley (1995a) is also troubling, as the 
trend of using SA and Endsley’s (1995a) definition in real-world assessment continues.  It 
remains imperative to understand the cognitive processes influencing operator’s ability 
23 
 
to perceive, understand, and predict environments, and this pressure is echoed in the 


























CHAPTER 2: EXPERIMENT 
The following experiment was conducted as a way of assessing the relationship 
between WM and two distinct Levels of SA (Level 1 and Level 3) as defined by Endsley 
(1995a).  These relationships can be examined through assessment of the correlations 
between measures of WM and measures of implicit operator SA taken within 
performance of a simulation.  By implicit scenarios with different SA requirements in a 
simulation, I addressed specific Levels of awareness in novice participants.  Using 
implicit measures of SA allowed investigation of awareness while limiting interference 
with operator cognition, which is particularly important to novice performance.   
Several hypotheses were tested using these methods.  WM was tested as a 
significant predictor of SA in trials that focused on Level 1 SA, as well as in more complex 
trials that were designed to assess Level 3 SA.  As previous work has shown, the WM-SA 
relationship may change across time and this was also an issue of investigation.  Finally, 
the relationship between WM and SA with performance was examined, as SA may 






118 students participated for optional, partial course credit.  Data from 19 
participants were lost from equipment or software errors, leaving 99 participants 
reported in these analyses. 
Materials and Procedure 
All WM tasks were run using the E-Studio software package on a Dell 4600 with a 
standard LCD display 12.5” and 9.5” in dimension. 
Working memory tasks. 
In the arrow span task (a modified version of the arrow span task from Shah & 
Miyake, 1996), participants were instructed to keep track of the orientation of arrows 
presented one at a time and to later recall the order and the orientation of the arrows 
they were shown during each trial.  Participants recorded responses using a circular 
response grid with 8 locations corresponding to each of the 8 possible presentation 
directions.  The size of the set of arrows shown to participants varied randomly between 
three and seven presentations.  No directions were repeated within a set, and each set 
size size (three, four, five, six, and seven presentations) was selected randomly for a 
total of three times overall for each size.   
In the automated symmetry span task, (Kane et al., 2004; Unsworth, Heitz, 
Schrock, & Engle, 2005) participants were shown images and asked to judge whether 
the image was symmetrical along the vertical axis.  Following each image judgment, a 
number was presented.  After a series of presentations, participants were asked to 
recall the numbers shown in order for that series of trials.  The sizes of the set of images 
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shown varied randomly between two, three, four, five, and six images during the trials 
and in total three trials of each set length were presented.   
In the automated reading task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Unsworth et al., 
2005) participants were asked to read sentences presented one at a time.  After the 
sentences were read, participants judged whether the sentence made semantic sense, 
after which a number was presented for a brief period of time, and then the next 
sentence appeared.  After each sentence set was completed, participants were asked to 
recall the numbers presented after each sentence in serial order.  The sizes of the set of 
sentences varied randomly between two, three, four, five, and six sentences, and in 
total three trials of each set length were used. 
Networked fire chief (NFC) simulation. 
The simulation used in this experiment is a dynamic fire-fighting simulation 
program Networked Fire Chief (NFC; Omodei & Wearing, 1998).  A typical operator-
perspective view of the simulation can be seen in Appendix A.   
NFC scenarios. 
 One basic Practice scenario was used for NFC training trials.  This was designed 
to give participants experience in every aspect of the simulation, from controlling fire 
engine movement, to putting out fires, filling engines with water, monitoring wind 
direction, and assessing fire locations.  Two additional types of scenarios were 
developed in NFC to address the theorized components of Level 1 SA and Level 3 SA in 
novice operators.  For each scenario type, aspects of the operator’s performance were 
hypothesized to implicitly reflect awareness.   
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Detection scenario trials were developed to assess Level 1 SA.  During Detection 
scenarios, participants were asked to locate fires currently burning, as well as fire trucks 
and current wind direction on a display of the land over a brief time period, and then 
post-trial recall the location of fires, fire engines, and the wind direction without 
consulting the simulation.  These trials ranged in difficulty from the easiest trials (4x4 
trials), where participants had to locate 4 fire engines and 4 fires, to the most difficulty 
conditions, in which participants had to locate 8 fire engines and 8 fires (8x8 trials).  A 
mixed condition was also generated for each item, such that participants also 
completed 4 trials of 4x8 (4 fire engines, 8 fires) and 4 trials of 8x4 (8 fire engines, 4 
fires).  A total of 16 Detection trials were developed, 4 of each difficulty type. This was 
expected to give a sense of whether people may differ in their ability to perceive 
important elements of the situation, and the task implicates processes shown to 
underlie Level 1 SA, in that fires, engines, and wind direction are critical to the task of 
putting out fires and require operator attention and perception in order to be noticed.  
Importantly, this is a more memory-based test of awareness. 
Prediction scenario trials were developed to assess Level 3 SA.  During Prediction 
scenarios, participants were given several fire engines to control and told to prevent 
critical areas (houses) from being burned from fires started at varying locations.  These 
housing locations were different during each trial, providing an element of randomness 
that precluded the participants from being cued via context as to the location of initial 
fires.  The critical areas themselves differed in spatial location between trials, and in 
addition several areas that looked perceptually similar were included in each simulation, 
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forcing participants to carefully distinguish critical from non-critical areas.  Each scenario 
also contained a built-in event set to occur at a time within 5 seconds of the median of 
the simulation trial duration.  In the event, wind direction was programmed to shift 
directions to fuel a new fire which started in a location bordering a critical area on the 
map.  If left unchecked the fire progressed through critical house areas, therefore the 
new goal that arises in the simulation should be to predict this change and allocate 
resources appropriately (view and react to the fire). 
Awareness was implicitly assessed in each trial by tracking how long it took 
participants to view fire engines at the beginning of the trial (VT-F), the time it took 
participants to view a new fire event (VT-E) and how long it took to respond to this new 
event (RT-E) by moving fire engines.  For RT-E, a response was defined as the time at 
which moving a fire engine to the immediate vicinity of the new event area occurred.  A 
flow diagram can be found in the results section and should aid understanding the time 
course of these measurements (see Figure 4).   
In conjunction, additional implicit measures were recorded during Prediction 
trials including idle time (in seconds) of the fire trucks in the simulation.  This was 
defined as any time in which the fire truck was not engaged in a task such as moving, 
refilling, or fighting a fire.  This gives an indication about the operator’s ability to 
multitask with fire engines and be generally aware of what each truck’s state is to allow 
efficient planning.   
It was theorized that the participant who demonstrated good SA in these 
Prediction scenarios would control the fire which starts closest to the critical land areas 
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first before progressing to stop other fires, and would remain aware and recognize 
when a new dangerous fire begins and act accordingly to stop the spread of the fire.  In 
addition, an increased ability to utilize resources (minimizing idle time) represents an 
awareness constraint such that operators who remain aware of their truck locations 
should be able to send them to more fires (and would have less idle time and higher 
performance in comparison to lower awareness participants). 
Procedure 
All participants completed three separate WM assessment tasks (symmetry task, 
arrow task, and reading task) which were counterbalanced between participants.   
Following completion of the WM tasks, a summary packet of information 
explaining the NFC simulation was given to participants (see Appendix B for a copy of 
the instructions).  Participants then completed 2 trials of the Practice NFC task each 
lasting 4 minutes, the goal of the training trials being to familiarize participants with the 
basic skills necessary to operate in the simulation and put out fires using fire engines 
provided on the map to the best of their ability.  Questions about operating NFC were 
not answered after the training phase.   
After completing 2 Practice NFC trials, participants completed the 16 randomized 
Detection trials.  During Detection trials, participants were instructed to find fire engines 
and in-progress fires on the displayed NFC map as well as attend to the wind direction.  
After a short presentation of the NFC map (5 seconds), the screen was blanked and 
participants recalled the locations of fires and fire engines as well as indicated the wind 
direction on a paper-based grid space provided.  
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Detection scenario trials were followed immediately by 6 unique Prediction trials.  
In Prediction trials, participants were told by the experimenter and reminded in the 
packet to attend to two key aspects of the simulation; 1) protect houses in the 
simulation at all costs, and 2) remain aware of any new fires that may or may not occur 
during the scenarios.  During Prediction trials, participants attempted to predict fires 
and fire spread to save important areas from burning.  Each trial lasted 5 minutes. 
Results 
Networked Fire Chief Performance 
Performance in the six Prediction trials was investigated as a measure of showing 
task learning.  As previously discussed, though good and poor SA is not a guarantee of 
good or poor performance, it is related (Endsley, 1993) and because of the impact of 
WM to performance it remains important to show that both WM and SA are separate 
contributors. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was calculated to test for a main effect of time on 
performance for the Prediction trials.  Because Maunchly’s test indicated the data 
violated sphericity (Χ2(14) = 76.12, p<.01), the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (Є = .775) 
was used to correct degrees of freedom.  There was a significant effect of time on 
performance in the simulation (F(3.87, 379.53)= 355.64, p<.01) which suggested that 
performance differed significantly between Prediction trials as a function of time spent 




Figure 1.  Performance across Prediction trials. 
 An additional, more process-based measure (water use) was assessed within the 
context of the Prediction trials.  Water use was recorded as the amount of water used 
during the trials, and thus serves as a within-task measure of how often participants 
attempted to put water on fires which is thought to reflect an aspect of prospective 
memory for the task, since in addition to moving an engine, participants have to 
remember to click to put water on a fire. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was calculated to test for a main effect of time on 
water used for the Prediction trials.  Maunchly’s test indicated the data violated 
sphericity (Χ2(14) = 67.91, p<.01) so the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (Є = .727) was 
used to correct degrees of freedom and a significant effect of time on water used in the 
simulation was found (F(3.64, 356.32)= 14.22, p<.01).  This suggested water used 
differed significantly between Prediction trials as a function of the amount of trials 

























Prediction trials over time 




Figure 2. Average water used across each Prediction trial. 
SA measure summary 
 In addition to characterizing performance over time, it is imperative to show 
similar data for each implicit SA measure for both Detection and Prediction trials.  
Detection trials will be examined first (see Figure 3). 



























































Error for individual fire engines and fire locations was calculated as the 
geometric distance between the actual location in the scene presented, and the 
participant-indicated location.  If no fire engine or fire location was indicated as being 
present by participants, maximum error (36) was assigned for that item. 
It is clear that while participants were not performing optimally, there is a 
reasonable range of performance in Detection trial SA measures for WM measures to 
account for (see Figures 3).  For instance, error in truck location and fire location has a 
potential minimum of 0 but a maximum of 36 per item located, and participant means 
per item in each trial are much closer to maximal (however, not at ceiling). 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for fire location error across time in 
the Detection trials, but was not significant indicating that performance was relatively 
uniform across this measure (F(3, 294) = 0.20, p>.05).  An additional repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted on fire engine location error across trials in the Detection trials 
as well as wind direction accuracy.  A significant effect was found for engine location 
(F(3,294) = 11.53, p<.01), suggesting that error varied in this task across time.  A 
significant effect was not found for wind direction accuracy (F(3, 288)=2.482, p>.05). 
 Prediction trial SA measures were measured implicitly over time (see Figure 5 





Figure 4.  Linear depiction of the measurement of VT-F, VT-E, and RT-E in relation to 

































Figure 6.  Average idle time of fire engines across Prediction trials. 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for VT-F across time in the 
Prediction trials and after correcting for a violation of sphericity (Χ2 (14) = 200.01, p<.05) 
using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (Є =.560), VT-F was found to significantly vary 
across time (F(2.802, 274.589)=13.06, p<.01).  A similar procedure was conducted for 
VT-E, RT-E, and idle time across time in the Prediction trials; VT-E was found to 
significantly vary across time (F(4.58, 448.786)=14.62, p<.01), as was RT-E (F(4.19, 
410.54)=5.64, p<.05) and idle time (F(2.58, 252.85) = 4.63, p<.05).  Thus SA measures 
significantly change across trials and relationships, for both early task performance and 
late task performance, and in both Detection and Prediction trials. 
Factor Scoring of WM Measures 
 A factor analytic approach is founded on the assumption that these task 
measures are related to one another but not perfectly, as they are expected to be 


























Idle time across Prediction trials 
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between each task (see Table 1) and the pattern supported this approach as the 
measures show some but not complete correlation.  
Table 1. 
 Task  Correlation  
   1 2 3 
1 Arrow Span 1 - - 
2 Symmetry Span .243* 1 - 
3 Reading Span 0.114 .342** 1 
n=99; * = p<.05; ** = p<.01 
 
 
Figure 7.  Working memory task performance across Arrow span, Symmetry span, and 
Reading span. 
Factor scores for each participant were calculated using unrotated mean 
accuracy rates from each of the three WM tasks (results of each task shown in Figure 7).  


























Component Matrix 1  
Arrow span 0.529  
Symmetry span 0.795  
Reading span 0.731  
Unrotated loadings onto a single factor 
WM Relationship with SA 
Of primary interest in this study was whether WM is related to measures of SA.  
This question was addressed under two conditions; one in which Level 1 SA was 
primarily assessed (Detection trials), and one in which Level 3 SA was primarily assessed 
(Prediction trials).  The results are broken into these two levels for clarification. 
Detection Trials (Level 1 SA) and WM 
For Detection trials which were designed to assess Level 1 SA, error was 
calculated for each measure as previously stated.  Per-engine error overall (M=18.82, 
SD=5.03) was calculated as the total error for engine locations divided by the number of 
engines present in each trial.  Per-fire location error overall (M=23.79, SD=5.50) was 
calculated similarly.  Finally wind direction accuracy (M=64.5, SD=28.66) was calculated 
using a binary scale (1 being correct, 0 being incorrect) over all Detection trials.  Pearson 
correlation coefficients were calculated for comparisons between WM and error in 
participant responses in the Detection trials.  It was predicted that WM would correlate 
with errors in Level 1 SA.  WM was not significantly correlated with per-fire location 
error (r= 0.16, p>.05), per-engine location error (r= -0.07, p>.05), or wind direction 
accuracy (r= 0.08, p>.05).  However, because SA is rarely thought of as a singular item 
but rather a broad concept, a composite measure was calculated.  Because no one SA 
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variable was more important than another, the simplest solution was to use 
standardized scores for each variable and sum them.  Even in this case, WM did not 
correlate significantly with the combined score (M=0.00, SD=1.92; r=-.005, p>.05). The 
null results here, while contrary to predictions, do show that memory-based measures 
of SA do not necessarily have to substantially reflect WM. 
Although WM was not correlated with mean SA errors in Detection trials, 
perhaps the relationship is subject to change across time as previously discussed.  Given 
the results of earlier repeated measures analysis showing error changes significantly 
over time, I split results into early (trials 1-8) and late (trials 9-16) performance.  Pearson 
correlations were calculated for examining each SA variable’s relation to WM.   
Within early trials, WM was not significantly correlated with fire location error 
(r=.141, p>.05), fire engine location error (r=-.03, p>.05), or wind direction accuracy (r=-
.077, p>.05).  The relationship did not change when looking at results from the late trials 
as well, and no significant correlations were found between fire location (r=.156, p>.05), 
engine location (r=-.09, p>.05), or wind (r= -.138, p>.05).  Therefore the WM-SA 
relationship was not shown to be significant in the Detection trials. 
WM and SA as a function of difficulty. 
One additional question may be whether the WM relationship with SA differed 
according to task difficulty in Detection trials.  Previous work by Endsley and Bolstad 
(1994) suggested especially for attention or perceptual tasks the relationships with SA 
are tenuous, and within their experiment perceptual tasks only related to SA for the 
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most difficult trials.  To look at this in Detection trials I examined error for each measure 
averaged for the difficulty of the trial.   
Figure 8. Fire engine and fire location error for easy (4x4) and difficult (8x8) conditions 




Figure 9. Wind accuracy across task difficulty for Detection trials. 
 
Easier  4x4 Detection trials resulted in less total engine locating error than 8x8 
trials (t(98)= -28.45, p<.05) and fire location error showed the same pattern, with 













































direction did not significantly change between easier 4x4 trials and more difficult 8x8 
trials (t(98)= .759, p>.05). 
Given that task difficulty affected error in Detection trials, additional Pearson 
correlations were calculated using error based on task difficulty and examining how this 
related to WM.  No significant correlations were found between WM and the easier 4x4 
Detection trials for fire location error (r= .09, p>.05) nor engine location error (r= -.11, 
p>.05) nor wind accuracy (r= .084, p>.05).  At higher difficulty 8x8 Detection trials no 
significant correlations were found either; fire locations (r=.08, p>.05) nor engine (r= -
.10, p>.05) nor wind (r=-.009, p>.05) was significant.  Thus while the difficulty in the 
Detection trials was shown to influence the error rates themselves, it was not found to 
influence the relationship between Level 1 SA information and WM. 
Level 3 SA (Prediction Trials) 
Another aim of this study was to examine the relationship between WM and 
Level 3 SA.  Pearson correlations were calculated between WM factor scores and the 
dependent SA measures averaged across scores during Prediction trials (VT-F, VT-E, RT-
E, and idle time).   
As previously explained for Level 1 SA, an overall SA composite score was 
calculated as a summation of all standardized SA measures from the Prediction trials 
(M= 0.00, SD=1.91).  The combination was significantly negatively correlated with WM 
(r= -.291, p<.01) such that higher WM was related to higher overall SA, via less time for 
each measure.  This provides some evidence that WM is related to a composite measure 
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of SA, and subsequent individual analyses were then used to examine the different 
elements.  
Pearson correlations showed WM was negatively correlated with VT-F (r=-.212, 
p<.05)  and mean idle time (r= -.249, p<.05), thus higher WM ability was significantly 
related to lower time overall to view fire engines (VT-F) and lower idle time of fire 
engines.  This also supports the idea that awareness in the Prediction task is related to 
WM ability.  However WM was not significantly correlated with mean RT-E (r=-.002, 
p>.05) or mean VT-E (r=-.088, p>.05).   
As both of these event-related SA measures also do not appear to be improving 
over time, one possibility is that participants may have cognitively tunneled in the initial 
firefighting at the beginning of each trial and thus failed to check the surrounding non-
viewable area in the simulation for new fires.  Tunneling may occur for a multitude of 
reasons, but most primarily is due to high levels of interest or engagement and saliency 
within tasks (Alexander, Wickens, & Hardy, 2006; Thomas & Wickens, 2001).  However, 
examination of the data offered no direct evidence to support such a hypothesis1. 
To explore any potential change in the correlative relationship between WM and 
SA over time, Pearson correlations between WM and each SA measure were examined 
for early and late Prediction trial performance.  For early Prediction trials, WM did not 
correlate significantly with any of the implicit SA measures; VT-F (r=-.188, p>.05), VT-E 
(r=-.09, p>.05), RT-E (r=-.01, p>.05), or idle time (r=-.19, p>.05).   
                                                            
1 By splitting participants into groups on their viewing of and responding to the critical event (non-
maximum times) or not over the course of the 6 Prediction trials, I was able to address a possible 




However for later Prediction trials, idle time was significantly negatively 
correlated with WM (r=-0.27, p<.01); the other SA measures were not (VT-F; r=-.12, 
p>.05, VT-E; r=-.06, p>.05, RT-E; r=.02, p>05).  This shows how the correlation between 
WM and implicit SA measures may be subject to change over time in performing a task. 
Performance: WM and SA Correlations 
Finally, the correlation between WM and performance, and SA and performance 
in Prediction trials was assessed.   
A Pearson correlation was calculated for comparing WM to performance overall 
in Prediction trials (M =78.07, SD=1.81) and was found to be significantly positive 
(r=.331, p<.05), such that a higher WM ability was related to better performance overall 
in Prediction trials.   
However given that performance changed significantly over time, it was 
important to investigate the WM relationship across time as well, and performance was 
split into early (trials 1-3) and late (trials 4-6) performance to examine this.  Within early 
performance, WM was significantly positively correlated with performance in Prediction 
trials (r=.261, p<.01), and this relationship existed in a stronger form when later trials 
were examined (r=.345, p<.01), suggesting that higher WM ability related to higher 
performance on Prediction trials.  These results are congruent with those of Rabbitt et 
al. (1989) suggesting ability correlates with performance in a task increase over time, 
rather than decreasing. 
Similar analyses were calculated with the process measure of performance 
(water used) overall (M= 45.36, SD= 15.10).  A Pearson correlation was calculated and 
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showed WM significantly related to this measure (r = .202, p<.05), suggesting higher 
WM ability enabled participants to deploy more water in the simulation.   
As this measure also changed over time, water used was split into early (trials 1-
3) and late (4-6) usage amounts.  Within both early water usage (r= .186, p>.05) and late 
(r= .194, p>.05) WM was not significantly related, though both of these effects were 
marginal.  Therefore within process measures no change was observed in the 
relationship with WM over time in the Prediction trials. 
SA and performance in Prediction trials. 
SA may play a role in driving performance (Endsley, 1993).  The SA Level 3 
composite score was found to significantly negatively correlate with overall 
performance (r =-.652, p<.01) and with water used during the simulation (r=-.421, 
p<.01).  This suggests that decreased time across several SA measures results in 
increases in performance and in the amount of water used in the simulation. 
Examining the individual SA measures and relating them to performance may 
help shed light on whether any one particular measure is driving this relationship and 
whether this relationship changes across time.  Pearson correlation coefficients showed 
that for early trials (again, 1-3) VT-F was negatively correlated (r=-.234, p<.05); VT-E was 
negatively correlated (r=-0.241, p<.05), and idle time (r=-.479, p<.01) was also negatively 
correlated with performance, suggesting that decreases in time to view or react was 
associated with increased performance in early Prediction trials.  RT-E was the only SA 
measure not significantly correlated (r=-.002, p>.05). 
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In the later Prediction trials, VT-F was correlated with performance (r=-.318, 
p<.01), as was VT-E (r=-.273, p<.01) and idle time (r=-.604, p<.01).  This again suggests 
that a decrease in the time to gather awareness information or orchestrate fire engine 
movements and activities is related to increased performance in later Prediction trials.  
RT-E was again the only measure that did not significantly relate to performance (r=-
.128, p>.05). 
Because of the related nature of WM and SA in their potential to predict 
performance in the simulation, tests for a mediating relationship were conducted with 
the idea that SA is a potential mediating variable between WM and performance.  This 
relationship is in part suggested by Endsley (1993) by showing that performance does 
not directly depend on SA, but SA may contribute to good or bad performance. 
SA was tested for mediation according to the steps outlined by Baron and Kenny 
(1986).  WM (beta= .237, t(97)=2.40, p<.05) was first shown to significantly predict 
average performance (R2=.056, F(1, 97) = 5.76, p<.05); then WM (beta=-.249, t(97)=-
2.53, p<.05) was shown to was shown to significantly predict SA (R2=.06, F(1,97) = 6.40, 
p<.05); and finally WM and SA standardized variables were added to a stepwise model 
predicting performance in which WM was no longer a significant predictor (beta=.13, 
t(96)=1.43, p>.05) after adding SA (idle time; beta=-.415, t(96) = -4.46, p<.001) to the 
model (R2=.218, F(1,96)=19.85, p<.001); see Figure 10 for the mediation model. 
 









Figure 10.  Mediation model for WM, SA (idle time) and average performance in 
Prediction trials. 
 
Because the beta associated with WM was not zero, the relationship shows 
partial mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986).  This suggests that WM clearly influences SA 
and perhaps those with ability in this area are able to develop a higher level of 
awareness, which then furthers their performance above others.  Importantly these 
data do not speak to the rate of development of any SA ability, simply that participants 
appear to be learning to be generally aware in the task. 
SA and Water Usage in Prediction trials. 
In addition to examining relationships between SA and performance, the 
relationships between SA and a process-based measure of performance, water usage, 
were also tested.  Pearson correlation coefficients showed for early trials, all implicit SA 
measures were correlated to water usage except for VT-F : r=-.011, p>.05.  VT-E was 
positively correlated (r=.248, p<.05), idle time was negatively correlated (r=-.741, p<.01) 
and RT-E (r=-.204, p<.05) was negatively correlated with early water usage, suggesting 
that more water used by the participant during the early simulation trials, the slower 








In the later Prediction trials, both VT-F (r=-.154, p>.05) and RT-E (r=-.059, p>.05) 
were not correlated with water usage.  However, VT-E still correlated with usage 
(r=.210, p<.05) as did idle time (r=-.855, p<.01), suggesting again that the more water 
used, the slower participants were to view the event and the less overall idle time they 























CHAPTER 3: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
WM and SA: Related? 
It was hypothesized WM would be able to predict participant’s error in locating 
elements of information in Level 1 based trials in NFC, as well as differences in implicit 
measures of Level 3 SA in later trials.  However, WM did not correlate with error during 
Level 1 Detection trials even when a composite measure was used, and this is especially 
surprising given the memory-based nature of the task.   
While no relationship was found for Level 1 SA, significant relationships were 
found between implicit Level 3 SA measures and a factor-analyzed WM component, and 
these represent the unique findings in this experiment.  By showing implicit measures of 
SA are related to WM, a door opens to further study of componential SA using 
unobtrusive methods and also importantly alludes to WM as a true cognitive influence 
on SA and not a potential artifact of memory-based assessments.  These results also 
support Endsley’s (1995a; 1995b) seminal work by showing clear separation between 
Level 1 and Level 3 SA, especially as it relates to influence from WM ability.   
Also of interest was the nature of any correlative relationship between WM and 
SA over time.  In the case of Level 3 SA, this correlative relationship does not appear to 
decline over time in the task, and suggests in novices the influence of WM on SA may 
persist as expertise develops.   
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One additional distinctive aspect of this experiment relates to the WM construct 
used, which is uniquely devoid of other unrelated task influence.  Only measures of WM 
previously shown to load well onto a strictly WM construct were used (Engle et al., 
1999).  However, one may attribute the strength of the relationships shown here as low, 
due to WM being a separate component of general or fluid intelligence.   
The consensus of researchers on how much relation exists between WM and 
fluid intelligence remains mixed at best.  Engle and colleagues have shown a strong 
relationship (.49) exists between WM and fluid intelligence and they argue a 
relationship exists because of the common use of the central executive (Engle et al., 
1999) for both WM and fluid intelligence tasks.  Ackerman, Beier and Santacreu (2005) 
additionally showed support in their meta-analysis that a relationship exists between 
WM and fluid intelligence.   
However others (Colom, Rubio, Shih, & Santacreu, 2006) have shown the 
relationship between fluid intelligence and WM remains even after removing the 
variance due to an executive control component, suggesting this relationship may exist 
for other reasons.  It is thus quite impossible to draw direct comparisons between 
relationships shown with SA and task performance, and those which may result from 
using a measure of fluid intelligence in place or in addition to WM, other than to say 
they may be similar.   
One aspect of this assumed similarity could be found within correlations 
between WM and early, versus late performance shown here.  Learning is assumed to 
be most heavily influenced by g during early learning, though the correlations with WM 
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here increase, not decrease, over time, suggesting these two concepts are not 
equivalent.   
Future work in this area may be interested in exploring these differential 
relationships, as fluid intelligence remains a mainstay in selection tests.   
WM-SA and Performance 
The relationship between WM and performance in Prediction trials appeared to 
be reflective of a similar result from Rabbitt et al. (1989) in which the association 
between task performance and WM ability actually increases over time in the task.   
One way this may be occurring and is supported by data from the current 
experiment is through development of an SA “skill” in which participants with higher 
WM are learning to be more aware of upcoming changes in the environment compared 
to those with lower WM.  In other words, WM may become more related to 
performance over time via SA development.  Additionally, the relationship between SA 
itself and performance increases with time, suggesting that whatever awareness skill is 
being developed, it is aiding performance.  And finally, SA was shown as a mediating 
variable between WM and performance in Prediction scenarios, which supports the 
postulation that WM is driving the development of awareness skills contributing to 
effective task performance. 
These results are most likely not due to any calibration to the task or to SA 
measures (e.g., a repeated question may prompt users to focus on the future answering 
of the question, rather than the task at hand; arguably this results in something 
different than SA).  Prediction trials possessed inherent complexity and varied between 
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trials, which discourages any calibration to events and the lack of explicit SA queries 
meant participants had a much lower chance of anchoring on administered SA questions 
and then biasing responding. 
Implications of Implicit SA Measures 
As mentioned before, by assessing SA implicitly it is possible to avoid the large 
number of confounds which can be present in other methodologies (such as lack of real-
world conditions, reliance on purely memory-based queries, extrinsic workload 
influences, and subjective responses which have shown to be biased by non-SA 
information.   
All SA measures used in Prediction trials were implicitly assessed and successful 
at measuring awareness.  These results show in conjunction with evidence from Gugerty 
and Tirre (2000) and Vidulich, Stratton, Crabtree, and Wilson (1994) that implicit SA 
measures are useful for assessing SA.  Furthermore, finding significant correlations with 
WM makes a strong case for the use of implicit measures for examining cognitive 
relationships with SA.  It fact may require this type of experimental methodology to 
observe WM and other cognitive construct relationships to SA in such a clear manner. 
Conclusion and Future Implications 
In sum, WM clearly relates to the proposed implicit measures of SA for trials that 
targeted Level 3 awareness.  Like the relationship between performance and WM, which 
increased over time in NFC, SA was consistently related to performance in Prediction 
trials and this relationship was shown to increase as well, though the WM-SA 
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relationship only grew significant in later trials.  SA was additionally shown to be a 
partial mediator between WM and performance in this relationship.   
One methodologically unique contribution to this research was utilizing factor 
analysis to build a WM construct out of several traditional WM tasks.  By combining 
scores from multiple WM tasks into one construct, we can be sure the construct is well 
represented, and indeed in investigations where only small amounts of variance are 
accounted for in SA, this is a principal issue.  Future work in this area may find that 
adopting this method results in being able to build a stronger case for WM influences. 
Additional consideration may be given to the way performance is measured for 
tasks that involve SA.  Measures of performance may reflect the awareness attained 
especially for novices, but they are also influenced by WM.  Perhaps SA metrics can 
serve as an additional indicator of another operator skill, especially for novice.  It 
remains to be seen if similar effects would be found with expert participants, though the 
evidence available certainly suggests experts would not be taxed to the amount that 
would elicit differences based on WM ability even in Prediction-style trials and would be 
more likely to differentiate as a function of experience (e.g., flight time, years of 
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Appendix B: Networked Fire Chief Instructions
 
